An anthropologist under surveillance in Ceauşescu’s Romania by Verdery, Katherine
Imagine yourself as the object of the fol-
lowing surveillance report, found in the file 
the Romanian Secret Police (Securitate) kept 
on me from 1973–1988. I came into possession 
of this file in 2008, through the provisions of a 
Romanian law that gave people access to their 
surveillance files from the communist period. 
I had spent more than three years conducting 
research in Romania during that period.
“5 January 1985. Katherine Verdery, 36 
years old, Professor … of Anthropology … Bal-
timore, USA, [is] identified as being an agent 
of the American espionage services … From the 
surveillance measures undertaken concerning 
her, the following has resulted: her proposed 
research theme represents merely a cover for 
unfolding an intense espionage activity, mate-
rialized in collecting socio-political informa-
tion, studying and inciting certain Romanian 
citizens’ antisocial activity by encouraging their 
hostile attitudes and manifestations.
In collecting information, Katherine Ver-
dery focuses especially on the following themes 
[long list], [all of which are beyond the scope of 
her official research project].
To obtain the data of interest to her, she 
makes contact with [various kinds of people]. 
The discussions carried on with them are writ-
ten in shorthand or tape recorded. After she 
gathers and verifies the information, she syn-
thesizes it in numbered daily reports, typed in 
three copies, which she sends periodically to the 
U.S. Embassy in Bucharest … With the help 
of informers, our organs were able to copy 165 
pages of these reports … . We note that she does 
not keep a single copy for herself, as would be 
normal if she were using them to write a scien-
tific work…  
Analysis of the reports demonstrates that 
she has rich experience in intelligence work … 
Thus: The people contacted are called “inform-
ers,” [for whom she uses] conspiratorial names 
…
Alongside the information collected, she 
mentions the place and context of the discus-
sion, the informer’s “attitude,” the direct and 
Verdery, Katherine
kverdery@gc.cuny.edu  DOI 10.14232/belv.2014.4.11
An Anthropologist under Surveillance 
in Ceauşescu’s Romania*
Abstract U.S. anthropologists working in Romania in the 1970s and 1980s were under surveillance 
by the Romanian Securitate, as they probably were in other communist countries as well. This article is 
based on the author’s Securitate file, which a law passed in 1999 made available to anyone whom the Secu-
ritate had followed. It discusses similarities between the work of ethnographers and that of the Securitate, 
the question whether villagers believed that she was really a spy and the effects of the surveillance on the 
author’s own work and on the villagers she studied.
Keywords surveillance, secret police, Romania, anthropology
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by University of Szeged
BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E  Eyewitness1392014. 4.
subsidiary questions she asks in directing the 
conversation toward the subject of interest. [ex-
amples …]
Analysis of her reports shows that the infor-
mation she gathers is exclusively in the category 
of what can be used in developing hostile propa-
ganda against our country. Likewise, she inter-
prets all the data in a tendentious manner …
With a view to finalizing this case, together 
with following her via all available professional 
means, we will act to investigate her contacts, 
toward the aim of obtaining certain proof neces-
sary to interrupting her activity…”1
In response to this report, Romania’s dep-
uty Securitate chief (general Iulian Vlad) wrote 
to his two immediate subordinates:
“Comrade General Alexie, Comrade Lieu-
tenant Colonel Diaconescu, 1) The case is very 
important and any negative developments, any 
proliferation must be stopped immediately. 2) It 
is urgent that you submit concrete proposals to 
conclude this case.”2
In short, not only was I the object of 
intense surveillance, but also among those 
watching me were the country’s top-secret po-
lice generals. It is almost as if you obtained your 
FBI file and found documents about yourself 
signed by J. Edgar Hoover.
Coming into possession of one’s surveil-
lance file raises both interesting possibilities 
and a host of questions. The possibilities in-
clude the chance to conduct ethnographies of 
the secret police, using its files as a database. 
My surveillance file consists of officers’ notes 
and syntheses, informers’ reports, as well as re-
ports from my being tailed and from intercept-
ed phone conversations and correspondence. 
 1 Archive of the National Council for the Study of the 
Securitate Archives, Bucharest, Romania (ACNSAS), 
Fond Documentar File 12618. vol. 1. 245–246.
 2 ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, File 195847. vol. 1, 193. 
Vlad was then deputy head of Romania’s Securitate, 
soon to become its head (1987).
Very importantly, it also includes the marginal 
notes of superior officers who read the reports 
as well as the orders they sent down. Because 
it was never intended – never imagined – that 
the targets of surveillance would see the notes 
taken on them, the notes are unaffected by any 
concerns about intersubjectivity. I believe we 
can read the notes for the officers’ worldviews, 
their system of knowledge-producing catego-
ries, their bureaucratic communication paths, 
their practices and expectations, and how they 
projected themselves into a world of imagined 
capitalist enemies. This database does not tell 
us much about the officers’ private thoughts 
(nor are they themselves likely to tell us even 
now), and some content is inaccurate, as is true 
of our own field notes. But the files do show 
the discourses and practices that the officers 
mastered by doing surveillance.
Among the questions raised by these files 
are: Is the information in them “true” – are 
the Securitate good ethnographers? How do 
they go about collecting data and construct-
ing knowledge? Why do they think I am a 
spy? Then there are more speculative ques-
tions, such as, what are the consequences of 
ethnographers being followed as spies? What 
are the effects on their social relations, the 
kinds of information they can gather, and the 
knowledge they can produce? How does being 
followed involve ethnographers in a regime’s 
practices and affect respondents’ relationships 
with the regime?
Ethnographers as Spies
During the Cold War, Romania was the 
only Eastern European country to include an-
thropologists on its list of welcome Fulbright 
scholars. As a consequence, more US ethnogra-
phers went there than to any other Soviet bloc 
country. I was one of about 10 such people to 
work in Romania between the early 1970s and 
1989, when the communist regime fell. From 
that work, I published several articles and two 
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books: Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centu-
ries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change 
(California, 1983) and National Ideology un-
der Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceauşescu’s Romania (California, 1991).
Despite the Romanian government’s wel-
come, virtually every US scholar or lecturer 
was under surveillance and has at least a few 
notes about him or her in the Securitate files. 
Most have several hundred pages. In the Secu-
ritate archive, I consulted a massive 26-volume 
dossier covering US lecturers, researchers and 
Ph.D. students. The dossier shows that many 
if not most of them were suspected of working 
for US intelligence under the cover of their 
research. Not one of the US anthropologists 
whom I know has been left out of this large 
dossier. It is clear that Romanian intelligence 
officers assumed there could be no disinter-
ested research, that foreigners were there to 
stir up trouble, and that we had been trained 
in counterintelligence.
That assumption was reinforced by the 
similarity of my ethnographic research meth-
ods to the Securitate’s. As the excerpt I quoted 
from my surveillance report makes clear, of-
ficers thought they recognized in my ethno-
graphic practices their own norms of profes-
sional conduct. They too used pseudonyms for 
“informers,” coded notes, tape recorders, and 
a comprehensive data-gathering strategy that 
went beyond the confines of a single project 
statement. Like me, they generated a wealth of 
typed data, producing from their observations 
an enormous body of field notes (their file on 
me contains 2,780 pages). And like me, they 
generated interpretations and conclusions: that 
I am a CIA agent, that I am feeding the US 
propaganda machine against socialism, that 
I am fomenting discontent among Romania’s 
minority Hungarians, and that therefore I 
should be sent home.
I had certainly given them reason for sus-
picion. During my first visit to the county I 
planned to work in, in September 1973, I man-
aged to ride my motorbike right past a sign that 
prohibited foreigners from travelling on that 
route (it led to a military base). Then, trying to 
repair the damage, I asked county officials to 
assign me to a safe area and picked one of its 
villages, Aurel Vlaicu. But Vlaicu turned out 
to contain a number of people who commuted 
to work in an armaments factory 20 kilometres 
away – a “coincidence” the Securitate took to 
mean that I was really a spy. The climate of the 
Cold War made these errors much more serious 
than they might have been otherwise, feeding 
the Securitate’s belief that I was up to no good.
How did this belief play out in Aurel Vlai-
cu? A number of my respondents there told me, 
both before and after the regime fell in 1989, 
that everyone knew I was a spy, though they 
did not really know what for. They just knew 
that everyone said I was one. This was partly 
the consequence of the Communist Party’s ef-
forts to spread information (and disinforma-
tion), including through films and literature 
that, as in western countries, popularized the 
notion of the spy. A Romanian acquaintance 
observed to me,
Children in school and everyone else were 
socialized into the idea of infiltration by for-
eign bodies as the cause of our problems. Now 
here you were, parachuting in. After all this 
abstract attribution, you were palpable. The 
police could say, “THIS is what a spy looks 
like. Here she is, in flesh and bone.”  You were 
a godsend for the Securitate. 
Whereas before, spies were something 
one saw in the movies, something that might 
have been made up, now people could point 
their fingers at one. 
I suspect that the Securitate planted the 
idea that I was spying. They did it first through 
the local police, as I realized one day in 1985 
when a respondent told me that one of the po-
liceman had been telling everyone to be care-
ful what they said to me, since I was a spy and 
carried a concealed tape recorder. They also 
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did it through the informers they recruited, 
who were instructed about how to recognize 
a spy. (Even people not recruited as informers 
might receive similar instruction. For instance, 
because Vlaicu was near an armaments factory, 
Securitate officers noted the names of everyone 
in every nearby village who worked in that 
factory, so as to give them all instruction re-
garding how to deal with me.) These informers, 
along with the police, might also have been told 
to plant rumours that I was spying.
Did villagers believe it? As I already in-
dicated, some of them told me they did, but 
further evidence comes from a Romanian 
scholar, Cosmin Budeanca, who is exploring 
how foreign researchers were received during 
the communist period. He went to Vlaicu and 
asked some people there what was said about 
me and whether they thought I was a spy. One 
answer he received was:
“Yes, people said she was a spy. But then 
after that they got used to her. She stayed a long 
time, and they got used to her.”
❖
This idea recurs in other interviews. Note 
the respondent’s assumption that I could be a 
spy only if I remained unknown, hidden. If I 
kept coming back and talking with everyone 
all the time, then I couldn’t be a spy. 
Another response given to Cosmin Bude-
anca was:
“People said she was a spy, but if she was 
one, they wouldn’t have let her into the country. 
And she didn’t have anything to spy on, ’cause 
we just talked about the collective farm. So if 
she’s sent here from Bucharest, why should she 
be a spy? … What would she have wanted to 
do, overthrow our government?  No. (So who 
said this kind of thing? …) Bad people! I had a 
brother-in-law … he was in the army, and he 
knew she was a spy. People just talked, because 
they’re bad.”
This respondent sees rumours of my spy-
ing as part of local politics and of people’s char-
acter, not as the truth about me. The respond-
ent also has a very narrow understanding of 
spying: it has to do with military matters and 
government overthrow. That differs from what 
Securitate officers worried about in the 1985 
report quoted above, which is that I collected 
“socio-political information” and created hos-
tile propaganda to undermine Romania’s im-
age in the world. 
These answers came 20 years after the fall 
of communism from women who had been my 
long-time friends. My constant returns had 
given them ample opportunity to “get used 
to” me. In contrast, during my shorter stay in 
another village, Geoagiu, the fact that the po-
lice were following me (as I learned after four 
months of work there in 1985) so disrupted my 
research that I had to abort it, once I under-
stood why people there seemed so much more 
reticent than those in Vlaicu. Geoagiu villagers 
were most likely reticent not from thinking I 
was a spy, but for fear of police interrogation 
following my visits, which happened shortly 
after I began work there. So I left Geoagiu for 
the city, where I limited my work to reading 
in libraries and talking with urban intellectu-
als, who were better able to defend themselves 
against such police actions.
Effects on Knowledge Production
During my research in the 1970s, I did 
not realize the extent of the surveillance I was 
under but knew I could get people into trouble 
by what I might write. I was concerned about 
how I would keep my publications from jeop-
ardizing innocent villagers when I could not 
anticipate what the government would find of-
fensive, sensitive, or problematic. Even though I 
gathered ethnographic data on a number of con-
temporary topics, these dilemmas, combined 
with the fact that I had always been interested 
in historical big-picture questions, tilted my 
first book in a historical direction, away from 
the ethnography of the socialist period. My in-
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terpretations dealt with an earlier time and 
relied extensively on published and archival 
material, compromising my respondents less. 
In the 1980s, surveillance forced the research 
for my second book even more toward use of 
published sources supplemented by conversa-
tions with urban intellectuals. I was not the 
only anthropologist of socialism to be caught in 
such dilemmas. Several other scholars did not 
publish the books from their 1970s fieldwork 
until after 1989, if at all.
Although the regime’s repression altered 
my entire research program, I think the knowl-
edge I produced was perhaps of greater valid-
ity. This is because it rested less completely on 
the fragile kinds of face-to-face relationships 
ethnography normally employs to excellent 
effect, but my circumstances were not normal. 
It is disturbing to have to admit that the Secu-
ritate not only changed my disciplinary profile 
away from ethnography and toward history, 
but also rechanneled my research and possibly 
improved its accuracy. Still, I believe this par-
adoxical and unexpected conclusion may be 
correct. It follows from what the possibility of 
surveillance did to my personal relationships.
Effects of Surveillance on Villagers
What effects might Securitate surveil-
lance have had on villagers? A man who in-
formed on me in the 1970s is willing to discuss 
that now, unlike many others who were also 
reporting on me at the time. The man was re-
cruited at while still in high school. His officer 
told him that I was a spy and it was his patri-
otic duty to report on my actions. The officer 
insinuated that my friend would not get into 
college, if he refused to cooperate. Although a 
top student, he was from a modest family and 
did not have the self-confidence to believe in 
his own capacities. He agreed to inform on me, 
because he wanted to have a future, which the 
officer was threatening. Before every biweekly 
meeting, my friend told me, he was awake all 
night because he was so terrified, and when 
his roommate would ask what was wrong he 
couldn’t respond, for informers were ordered 
never to reveal their work to anyone. 
The officer would begin their sessions by 
catching him off guard with some piece of in-
formation he was unlikely to have (such as an 
allegation about my sex life) and then press him 
for what else he could add. Because, according 
to the officer, they already knew everything I 
was doing, he had better tell them the truth: 
they would know it, if he did not. Thus, the 
officers used the man’s reports as a test of his 
relationship with them. In addition to catching 
me conducting espionage, the officer’s goal was 
to use me to forge trust with him so he would 
report on other people as well. My presence and 
“spying” had enabled this recruitment. 
My files contain reports from about 13 
informers from Vlaicu. Of these, several were 
probably not recruited just to watch me, as this 
person was. Given the injunction to silence, 
what they learned through spying did not enter 
village knowledge except as intentional dis-
information. But the villagers knew that the 
Securitate recruited informers and they knew 
there were informers in their midst, as did I. 
Who these were was uncertain, but my con-
stant presence kept the possibility more visible 
than it otherwise would have been. A cloud of 
unease swirled around me as I made my way 
from house to house. 
Surveillance substantially shifted the ter-
rain of fieldwork. Underpinning the work of 
ethnography is that precious and fragile rela-
tionship: trust. Although ethnography is possi-
ble in trust’s absence, our best work rests upon 
it. In a climate of surveillance, it is much more 
difficult to establish trusting relations, for there 
is a constant current of mistrust and doubt. 
Every interaction was anchored by the presence 
of a hidden third with whom I could develop no 
relationship: the Securitate officer. That third 
maintained a constant drag on the growth of 
other relationships, pulling each of them off 
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centre, just as an illicit affair decentres a per-
son’s marriage. Sometimes that hidden third 
was actually involved with my respondents; 
sometimes he was just a hidden possibility. 
By subjecting Romanians to this possibil-
ity, we “spies” drew them into a different feeling 
of relating with others, a feeling based on fear 
that sometimes isolated them by prohibiting 
their speech. Although we ethnographer-spies 
were not the only form of “enemies” that the 
Securitate controlled this way, we were particu-
larly helpful to them. Anthropologists enabled 
the Securitate to increase its penetration into 
rural areas, which had much fewer inform-
ers than urban centres did. Thus, we provided 
unprecedented access to villagers who might 
otherwise have remained outside the system 
of relations the police were trying to create. 
It is difficult to avoid the question as to 
whether ethnography is justified in circum-
stances like these. One might argue that pre-
cisely such revelations justify it, in the name of 
a freer world. Knowing how the police operate 
will help people resist the installation of such 
a system in the future. Perhaps the positive 
effects of the villagers’ exposure to another 
society (through their connection with me) 
counterbalanced some of the negative effects 
of Securitate repression. What is certain is that 
this example of an anthropologist under sur-
veillance challenges us, once again, to place 
ethnographic practice in a critical light. k
